Home Business What are the challenges of the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

What are the challenges of the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

by Bubbles

After seven years of rupture, the two great powers of the Middle East have reestablished their relations. This reconciliation reshuffles the maps of geopolitical balances, in the region and beyond.

Saudi national security official Musaid Al Aiban meets with his Iranian counterpart Ali Shamkani, hosted by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, on March 10, 2023 in Beijing. (CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY / ANADOLU AGENCY / AFP)

A historic encounter. King Salman of Saudi Arabia invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to visit Riyadh soon. This request comes shortly after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Concluded under the aegis of China on March 10, the agreement signed by Tehran and Riyadh provides for the reopening of the Saudi and Iranian embassies within two months, the relaunch of discussions on security, as well as economic cooperation. .
This process of rapprochement began in 2021 in Iraq, after five years of rupture. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran ended all ties in 2016 when Saudi diplomatic missions were attacked in Iran in response to Riyadh’s execution of a famous Shia religious leader.

An Iran better integrated in the Middle East

To show their support for Saudi Arabia, several Gulf countries had reduced their diplomatic ties with Tehran. Among them: the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan and Bahrain. In recent months, the Emirates and Kuwait, following Riyadh’s approach, have begun to renew relations with Iran. “Thanks to Saudi Arabia, Iran will be able to emerge from its isolation”, analyzes Hasni Abidi, specialist in the Middle East.




For several years, Tehran has been living under international sanctions, particularly American ones, targeting key sectors such as oil. Saudi Arabia, an ally of Washington, has even long supported these sanctions. Iran also accuses Israel of attacking its nuclear infrastructure. The pressure on the Iranian economy and currency has increased in recent months with new Western sanctions in response to protests sparked by the death in custody of Mahsa Amini on September 16, but also military aid that the Iran is accused of supplying Russia against Ukraine, which Tehran denies. Internally too, the regime has been weakened by massive protest since the death of Mahsa Amini. “The Iranians were up against the wall and Riyadh offers them a way out,” continues Hasni Abidi.
“It’s an economic rescue for Tehran, which will be able to rely on new allies in the region.”
Hope for calm in Yemen and Syria
This rapprochement also arouses the hope of de-escalation, even reconciliation, in countries at war where the two powers support opposing camps.
Since 2015, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has led a pro-government coalition fighting Houthi rebels (Shiite minority) supported by Tehran. On March 12, Iran’s mission to the UN said the agreement with Riyadh would “accelerate the ceasefire, help start a national dialogue and form an inclusive national government” in Yemen, according to the agency. Iranian official press Irna. A spokesman for the Houthis quoted by Al Arabiya (in English), however, recalled that the group was not “subordinate” to Tehran and that the resolution of the conflict should go through them and Riyadh.
In Syria, since the start of the war in 2011, Iran has been the main supporter of President Bashar Al-Assad, who comes from the Shiite Alawite minority, while Saudi Arabia supports opposition fighters. The Syrian Foreign Ministry described the agreement as an “important step that will lead to the strengthening of security and stability in the region”, quotes Associated Press (in English). “Saudi Arabia could lift its veto on the reintegration of Damascus into the Arab League, if Bashar Al-Assad agrees to distance himself from Tehran”, analyzes David Rigoulet-Roze, specialist in the Middle East at the Iris.
The beginnings of a regional geopolitical reconfiguration
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has been another area of rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 2019, a vast leak of Iranian intelligence documents showed the extent of Tehran’s political, economic and religious hold on the country. “Iraq is the main beneficiary of the restoration of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which will ease the pressure on the Iraqi scene,” said Iraqi analyst Ali Al-Baidar, quoted by AFP.
In Lebanon, this new agreement suggests a way out of the political crisis. Since the departure of former President Michel Aoun in October 2022, no successor has been appointed. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, has already chosen its candidate, Sleiman Frangieh, but Riyadh has vetoed this candidacy. To get Lebanon out of this impasse, “we will certainly have to find an arrangement”, believes David Rigoulet-Roze.
The Iranians will be observed in the coming weeks. Will they reduce their support for the Houthis? To Hezbollah? To the Shiite militias in Iraq? Saudi Arabia expects gestures of goodwill.
Either way, these mutations could take time. The Saudi foreign minister stressed that the agreement “did not mean that [Riyadh and Tehran had] found a solution to all the disputes between [them]”.
Israel finds itself isolated
The agreement sounds like a setback for Israel. Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid deplores “a total and dangerous failure of the Israeli government’s foreign policy.” This arrangement complicates Tel Aviv’s plans to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and pursue its strategy of isolating Tehran.
In 2020, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords aimed at normalizing their relations. This diplomatic breakthrough broke with decades during which it was inconceivable for an Arab country to recognize Israel without a settlement of the Palestinian question. “Israel hoped that Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords to create a united regional front against Iran, but it did not succeed,” said Hasni Abidi.
“This agreement (…) gives Iran the legitimacy it so badly needs in the Arab world”, writes the Israeli daily Haaretz (in Hebrew), quoted by Courrier international. It could lead to other agreements with Arab states such as Egypt (…) or even, who knows, lead to a resumption of negotiations to save the international Iranian nuclear agreement.” However, the Iranian nuclear program is perceived as an existential threat to Israel.
Israel finds itself isolated
The agreement sounds like a setback for Israel. Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid deplores “a total and dangerous failure of the Israeli government’s foreign policy.” This arrangement complicates Tel Aviv’s plans to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and pursue its strategy of isolating Tehran.
In 2020, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords aimed at normalizing their relations. This diplomatic breakthrough broke with decades during which it was inconceivable for an Arab country to recognize Israel without a settlement of the Palestinian question. “Israel hoped that Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords to create a united regional front against Iran, but it did not succeed,” said Hasni Abidi.
“This agreement (…) gives Iran the legitimacy it so badly needs in the Arab world”, writes the Israeli daily Haaretz (in Hebrew), quoted by Courrier international. It could lead to other agreements with Arab states such as Egypt (…) or even, who knows, lead to a resumption of negotiations to save the international Iranian nuclear agreement.” However, the Iranian nuclear program is perceived as an existential threat to Israel.
American diplomacy put to the test
“Anything that can help reduce tensions (…) is a good thing,” assured the head of American diplomacy Antony Blinken when the agreement was announced. But behind the scenes, this rapprochement embarrasses the United States.




It comes as Washington has mixed relations with Riyadh. In 2021, after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, Joe Biden authorized the declassification of documents attributing the journalist’s murder to Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The American president had also tackled the kingdom for its failure to respect human rights and the rule of law. “Joe Biden had made unappreciated criticism of the consequences of the intervention of the military coalition led by Riyadh in Yemen”, continues David Rigoulet-Roze. This did not prevent him from visiting the crown prince in 2022, so that he made a gesture on the price of oil, without conclusive result.
Mohammed bin Salman maintains interested and calculated relations with Moscow on oil, within the framework of OPEC +, and with Beijing, of which he is the main oil supplier.

Beijing’s Growing Influence in the Middle East

China has several interests in this agreement. Beijing is a major economic partner of Iran and Saudi Arabia and therefore needs stability in the region. “China buys Iranian oil, which is targeted by Western sanctions”, In the other direction, according to AP (in English), 30% of imports into Iran are of Chinese origin and Beijing has pledged to invest 400 billion dollars in the country over the next 25 years.

Last November, Riyadh purchased $4 billion worth of Chinese arms and equipment, reports the South China Morning Post. China, which until now has relied mainly on its economic influence, “is now positioning itself on the geopolitical register by presenting itself as a responsible and political actor”, analyzes David Rigoulet-Roze.

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